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Case No. 20160371-CA 
INTHE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
P laint{ff/ Appellee, 
V. 
CHRISTOPHER ALLEN WELLS, 
Defendant/ Appellant. 
Brief of Appellee 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Mr. Wells appeals from a conviction for furnishing alcohol to a minor, a class A 
misdemeanor. This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann.§ 78A-4-103(2)(e). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Whether the trial court denied Defendant from filing a motion for a new trial at his 
sentencing hearing, and if so, whether Defendant's assertion that he wanted to file 
a motion for a new trial was timely and proper. 
a. Standard of Review: This Court reviews conclusions of law for correctness. 
State v. Perkins, 2009 UT App 390, ,I 8,222 P.3d 1198. 
2. Whether Defense counsel's representation at the sentencing hearing constituted 
ineffective assistance of counsel. 
1 
a. Standard of Review: An ineffective assistance of counsel claim presents a 
question of law. State v. Clark, 2004 UT 25, iJ 6, 89 P.3d 162. To prove 
ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant must show; (1) that counsel's 
perfonnance was objectively deficient, and (2) a reasonable probability 
exists that but for the deficient conduct defendant would have obtained a 
more favorable outcome at trial. Id. 
3. Whether the trial court had an obligation to inquire into the nature of Defendant's 
dissatisfaction with counsel raised for the first time after trial. 
a. Standard of Review: Whether a trial court should have inquired further into 
a defendant's dissatisfaction with counsel is reviewed for an abuse of 
discretion. State v. Hall, 2013 UT App 4, iJ 8,294 P.3d 632. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The relevant rules are included in Addendum B of Appellant's Brief. 1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On June 1, 2015, Defendant was charged with furnishing alcohol to a minor, a 
class A misdemeanor. R. 5. On February 19, 2016, the case was tried before a jury which 
convicted Defendant on that charge. R. 107, 177-369. On April 14, 2016, a sentencing 
hearing was held. R. 150. Defendant's trial counsel indicated that his client wanted to 
request a new trial, which could possibly postpone sentencing. R. 150. The trial court 
determined that sentencing would go forward and that the time to file a motion or appeal 
1 Pursuant to rule 24(b)(2), Utah R. App. P., the State's brief will rely on Appellant's 
addendums, specifically addendums Band C. 
2 
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would commence after sentencing. R. 152. On May 3, 2016, Defendant filed his appeal. 
R. 135-36. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
At sentencing, the trial court inquired whether there was any legal reason why 
sentencing should not go forward. R. 150. Counsel for Defendant replied, "I'm not sure, 
your Honor. Mr. Wells has informed me that he'd like to request a new trial." R. 150. 
Trial counsel then advised the court that he had not had a chance to review the rule 
concerning motions for a new trial, however, he thought Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 59 
applied. R. 150. 
The trial court and counsel for Defendant then engaged in a discussion as to the 
amount of time Defendant had to file his motion under Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. R. 150-52. Trial counsel indicated to the court that it seemed his client would 
be outside the time period for filing such a motion due to judgment having been rendered 
at the trial approximately two months prior, however, the trial court clarified that the time 
to file his motion would not commence until after the "entry of judgment." R. 151-52. 
The trial court then stated, "In a criminal context judgment includes sentencing. 
Judgment is not completed until sentencing." R. 151. 
After determining that it is only after sentencing has occurred that there is "an 
official judgment point," the trial court told Defendant, "[i]t's going to have to be a 
situation of an appeal that your orig - - or that there was some error or inadequacy in your 
original trial. So sentencing is going to go forward today." R. 152. After the sentencing 
3 
hearing, Defendant never filed nor made any attempt to file a motion for a new trial. R.1-
152. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court did not deny Defendant from filing a motion for a new trial. 
Instead, it infonned him at his sentencing hearing that sentencing would proceed and any 
challenge of his conviction would need to be done after sentencing. Furthennore, trial 
counsel's assistance at sentencing did not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel and 
Defendant has failed to provide sufficient evidence to meet his burden of proof necessary 
to establish both that his trial counsel was objectively deficient and that he was 
prejudiced as a result of such deficient counsel. Finally, although the trial court has a duty 
to inquire into a defendant's dissatisfaction with his trial counsel prior to trial, the trial 
court has no duty to make such an inquiry where it is first raised after trial. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR WHEN IT DETERMINED SENTENCING 
WOULD PROCEED AS SCHEDULED. 
A. The Trial Court Did Not Prevent Defendant From Filing a Motion for a 
New Trial. 
Pursuant to Rule 24(b) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, "[a] motion for a 
new trial shall be made in writing and upon notice. The motion shall be accompanied by 
affidavits or evidence of the essential facts in support of the motion." 
At the sentencing hearing on April 14, 2016, the trial court asked defense counsel 
whether there was any legal reason why sentencing should not go forward. R. 150. It was 
at that point that defense counsel stated that his client wanted to file a motion for a new 
4 
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trial. R. 150. Defense counsel indicated he was unsure whether a request to file such a 
motion would constitute a sufficient reason to postpone Defendant's sentence. R. 150-51. 
Having just been advised of Defendant's intent to file such a motion, and not having had 
the opportunity to research the applicable law, defense counsel suggested that perhaps 
Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure applied to this issue. R. 150. 
Both defense counsel and the trial court then engaged in an informal discussion as 
to how much time Defendant had to file his motion and when that time would officially 
begin to run. R. 150-52. The trial court ultimately concluded that Defendant had ten days 
from the date of sentencing to file his motion. R. 151-52. 
It should be noted that this was an informal discussion made in open court at 
Defendant's sentencing hearing. Nothing pertaining to a motion for a new trial was 
before the court to consider, no motion had been filed, and the court did not make a 
ruling that day, except that sentencing would proceed. Furthermore, although defense 
counsel incorrectly identified Utah R. Civ. P. 59 as the applicable rule, the trial court 
advised Defendant the time to file the motion would not begin to run until after 
sentencing. R. 151-52; see Utah R. Crim. P. 24. 
Thus, the trial court did not deny or prevent Defendant from filing his motion. R. 
150-52. Instead, it correctly identified that he still had time to file his motion after 
sentencing was complete. R. 151-52. After the sentencing hearing, Defendant never filed 
a motion for a new trial, and he has failed to present any evidence other than the 
sentencing hearing record in an effort to demonstrate that he was denied the opportunity 
to file a motion for a new trial. Thus, the trial court did not err. Moreover, even if the 
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court had erred, which the State does not concede occurred, this is not a legal reason 
sufficient to support a remand to the trial court. 
B. Defendant's Assertion at the Sentencing Hearing That He Wanted to File a 
Motion For a New Trial Did Not Constitute a Motion. 
"A motion for a new trial shall be made ... after entry of the sentence." Utah R. 
Crim. P. 24( c ). In State v. Vessey, the defendant was convicted by a jury of rape of a 
child. 957 P.2d 1239, 1240 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). After conviction, but prior to being 
sentenced, the defendant filed a pro se motion for a new trial. Id. There, the court pointed 
to Rule 24 which requires that a motion for a new trial be filed "after imposition of 
sentence." Id. (no emphasis added). Because the motion was filed prior to being 
sentenced, "the motion was untimely under rule 24." Id.; see also State v. Putnik, 2002 
UT 122, iJ 8, 63 PJd 91 (holding that because the defendant filed a motion for a new trial 
after verdict, but before being sentenced, his motion was premature and untimely). 
In the present matter, Defendant advised the trial court that he intended to file a 
motion for a new trial. Despite providing the trial court with notice on that date, 
Defendant's expression to the trial court constituted nothing more than an intent to do 
something in the future. Because sentencing had not occurred, any motion or statement 
made to the court was premature. As such, the court had no duty or obligation to hear any 
evidence pertaining to a request for a new trial, nor did Defendant even indicate to the 
court that he had evidence to support such a request. 
6 
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Even if Defendant's statement to the trial court of his desire to file a motion for a 
new trial was sufficient to be considered an actual motion, it was made orally, and not in 
writing as required by Utah R. Crim. P. 24(b), and therefore, it was improper. Further, 
because it was first brought to the court's attention in open court at the sentencing 
hearing, the court did not receive proper notice and was not prepared to adequately 
address it. Thus, Defendant's expression of an intent to file a motion for a new trial is not 
a proper motion, and even if it was, which the state does not concede, it was premature. 
II. DEFENSE COUNSEL'S REPRESENTATION AT THE SENTENCING 
HEARING DID NOT CONSTITUTE INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE. 
To meet his burden of proof for an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, 
Defendant must show, "( 1) that counsel's performance was so deficient as to fall below 
an objective standard of reasonableness and (2) that but for counsel's deficient 
performance there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have 
been different." State v. Larrabee, 2013 UT 70, ~ 18,321 P.3d 1136. Courts have 
determined that "a reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine 
confidence in the outcome." State v. Mitchell, 2013 UT App 289, ~ 11, 318 P.3d 238; 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,688 (1984). 
Clearly, it was at the sentencing hearing that defense counsel was first apprised 
that Defendant wanted to file a motion for a new trial. R. 150. Defense counsel advised 
the court that he had not had an opportunity to research the rules, but thought that Rule 59 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure applied. R. 150. In looking at that rule counsel was 
advising the court that his client's desire to file a motion for a new trial might be a legal 
7 
reason why sentencing should be stayed or postponed. R. 150. He also suggested that 
because approximately two months had passed since judgment of guilt had been rendered 
by a jury, Mr. Wells' time to submit his motion had lapsed. R. 151. Nevertheless, the 
trial court correctly noted that the time to file his motion would not start until sentencing 
was complete, and thus, sentencing would proceed as scheduled. R. 151-52. 
Defendant's motion neither alleges, nor provides any other evidence beyond the 
sentencing hearing as proof that defense counsel was ineffective. Defendant has provided 
no substantive evidence that he attempted to file his motion and was prevented by the 
trial court. He provides no evidence regarding any communications made between him 
and his defense attorney after the sentencing hearing regarding his desire to file a motion, 
and how he was denied. Thus, the only suggested evidence of ineffective assistance of 
counsel in the record before the Court is the infonnal discussion at sentencing hearing. 
In essence, Defendant is asking the Court to look only at the sentencing hearing, in 
which an infonnal, unbriefed discussion regarding Defendant's desire to file a motion for 
a new trial was first raised to both defense counsel and the trial court, and in which no 
ruling or decision was made, except to proceed with sentencing, and deem that to be 
sufficient proof of ineffective assistance of counsel. 
As previously argued, Defendant was never told at the sentencing hearing that he 
could not file his motion, and, although defense counsel suggested the applicability of an 
incorrect rule, the court correctly advised him that the time to file his motion had not yet 
begun. That is, Defendant could have filed his motion for a new trial. What happened 
after the sentencing hearing with respect to the advice or counsel Defendant may have 
8 
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obtained regarding this issue is anyone's guess. Defendant has not provided an affidavit 
alleging facts occurring after the sentencing hearing which would support an ineffective 
assistance claim, and therefore, fails to meet the first prong of an ineffective assistance 
claim. Thus, there is insufficient evidence to support his request for remand. 
Nevertheless, even if Defendant had provided evidence sufficient to meet the first 
prong of an ineffective assistance claim, which the State does not concede, Defendant 
certainly has failed to meet his burden of proof for the second prong of the analysis. It is 
Defendant who "bears the burden of establishing prejudice as a demonstrable reality," 
and "the likelihood of a different result must be substantial, not just conceivable." State v. 
McNeil, 2013 UT App 134, 'if 30, 302 P.3d 844. 
To meet that burden, Defendant is required to show through a nonspeculative 
allegation of facts that had he timely filed his motion for a new trial, there is a reasonable 
probability that it would have been granted due to lack of confidence in the trial outcome. 
See generally Kell v. State, 2008 UT 62, 'if'if41-43, 194 P.3d 913; State v. Jimenez, 2012 
UT App 341, 'if 2,291 P.3d 866 (denying ineffective assistance of counsel claim where 
"there had been no showing for the second prong .... that there would have been a 
different outcome but for trial counsel's alleged ineffective assistance"). 
Here, Defendant has not alleged any facts for the Court to even consider whether 
or not he was prejudiced as a result of not submitting a timely motion. Furthermore, there 
is nothing in the record from which the Court could determine that Defendant was 
prejudiced. In the appellate docketing statement he indicates that the basis for his appeal 
was that trial counsel failed to call a "critical witness" who "would have exonerated Mr. 
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Wells." See Appeal Docketing Statement. Yet, there is nothing in the record regarding 
this "critical witness", and thus no evidence, to support that argument. 
If such evidence exists, Defendant was required under Rule 23B to file a motion 
for a temporary remand so that the trial court could establish a record to demonstrate both 
the alleged deficient perfonnance pertaining to Defendant's desire to file a motion for a 
new trial, as well as a record demonstrating how Defendant was prejudiced. See Mitchell, 
2013 UT App 289,142,318 P.3d 238. 
In Mitchell, the defendant alleged there were documents generated by an expert 
witness that were not in the record and which would exonerate him if admitted. 2013 UT 
App at 142. There, appellate counsel failed to move for a temporary remand to establish 
a record to show how his client was prejudiced. Id. As the court there stated, "If a 
defendant is aware of any 'nonspeculative allegation of facts, not fully appearing in the 
record on appeal, which, if true could support a detennination that counsel was 
ineffective, defendant bears the primary obligation and burden of moving for a temporary 
remand." Id.; State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, 116, 12 P.3d 92. There, the court stated, 
"Mitchell has not attempted to supplement the record with evidence tending to show that 
he was prejudiced. Absent a showing of prejudice, he is not entitled to relief." Id. 
Here, Defendant has failed to provide sufficient evidence, if any evidence, from 
the record that trial counsel was ineffective and how he was prejudiced as a result of that 
ineffective assistance. Moreover, he has failed to file a rule 23B motion and make a 
nonspeculative allegation of facts for the purpose of creating a record, and therefore, is 
10 
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barred from any request for a temporary remand. As such, Defendant has failed to meet 
his burden, and therefore, the Court should deny his request. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT WAS NOT OBLIGATED TO INQUIRE INTO 
DEFENDANT'S DISSATISFACTION WITH DEFENSE COUNSEL FIRST 
RAISED AFTER TRIAL. 
In State v. Hall, the court analyzed the well known State v. Pursifell case 
regarding a defendant's expression of dissatisfaction with appointed counsel, finding that, 
"the trial court 'must make some reasonable, non-suggestive efforts to determine the 
nature of the defendant's complaints and to apprise itself of the facts necessary to 
determine whether the defendant's relationship with his or her appointed attorney has 
deteriorated to the point that sound discretion requires substitution.'" Hall, 2013 UT App 
at ,I 13, (quoting State v. Pursifell, 746 P.2d 270, 273 (Utah Ct. App. 1987)). 
However, the court further clarified that "the Pursifell procedure does not apply in 
cases where the defendant raises his dissatisfaction with counsel's trial performance after 
the trial is complete." Hall, 2013 UT App at ,I 14; see State v. Franco, 2012 UT App 200, 
,I,I 3-5, 283 P.3d 1004. Thus, when dissatisfaction is disclosed to the court" 'after the 
trial has ended, his or her remedy lies in an appeal challenging the effectiveness of 
counsel's assistance.'" Jd.(quoting Franco, 2012 UT App at ,I,I 3-5). 
Here, Defendant first raised his dissatisfaction claim after trial and at the 
sentencing hearing held on April 14, 2016. R. 150. At that hearing counsel stated, "Mr. 
Wells has informed me that he'd like to request a new trial. I guess the basis for that is 
the fact that his Counsel was inadequate." R. 150. Therefore, because Defendant's 
dissatisfaction with trial counsel was first raised after trial, the trial court had no 
11 
obligation or duty to inquire into his dissatisfaction with counsel, and therefore, his 
constitutional rights were not violated. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should deny Appellant's request. 
Respectfully submitted on November 22, 2016. 
Isl Joshua B. Wayment 
JOSHUAB. WAYMENT 
Deputy Weber County Attorney 
Counsel for the State/ Appellee 
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE 
I certify that in compliance with rule 24(f)(l), Utah R. App. P., this brief contains 
3,098 words, excluding the table of contents and the table of authorities. I further certify 
that in compliance with rule 27(b), Utah R. App. P., this brief has been prepared in a 
proportionally-spaced font using Microsoft Word 2010 in Times New Roman 13 point. 
Isl Joshua B. Wayment 
JOSHUA B. WAYMENT 
Deputy Weber County Attorney 
Counsel for the State/ Appellee 
12 
('~ .,.......... ~~------··· ----
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that on November 22, 2016, two copies of the Brief of Appellee were 
mailed to: 
Samuel P. Newton 
Law Office of Samuel P. Newton, PC 
The Historic KM Building 
40 2nd Street East, Suite 23 5 
Kalispell, MT 59901-6114 
Also, in accordance with rule 26(b ), Utah R. App. P ., I hereby certify that on 
November 22, 2016, I have hand-delivered eight copies of the foregoing to: 
Utah Court of Appeals 
450 South State 
P.O. Box 140230 
Salt lake City, UT 84114-0230 
A digital copy of the brief in searchable portable document fonnat (pdf) was also 
included. 
13 
